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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

The Court Erred by Failing to Require the State to Comply with I.C.R. J6(b)(7)
Mr. Koch argued that the district court erred by failing to order the state to comply with

LC.R. 16(b)(7) and then by allowing Mydell Yeager to testifY. The state responds that Mr. Koch
has not shown the court abused its discretion in denying his discovery request. In particular, it
contends the disclosure was adequate "to satisfY the LC.R. 16(b)(7) requirement that the state
disclose the witness's opinions" and that it was not required to produce any "facts or data for
these opinions." State's Brief, pg. 8-9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
First, the standard of review of a decision that no discovery violation occurred is not
abuse of discretion. The case cited by the respondent, State v. Wilson, 142 Idaho 431, 128 P.3d
968 (Ct. App. 2006) (albeit with the "see" signal), does not stand for or even suggest that
proposition. The Wilson Court remanded the case to the district court for the failure to conduct
an in camera hearing as required by LR.E. 509. The question of the standard of review of
decisions under LC.R. 16 was not presented in that case. In fact, the appellate courts conduct a
review of the record to determine if the finding of the trial court regarding a claimed discovery
violation is supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203,
207-08,899 P.2d 416, 420-421 (1995). Ifa violation is found and a sanction imposed, the
sanction is reviewed under abuse of discretion standard. State v. Winson, 129 Idaho 298, 302,
923 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Ct. App. 1996).
Second, the district court's finding of compliance with LC.R. 16(b)(7) is not supported by
the record. To the contrary, the record is clear that the state's summary of Ms. Yeager's
testimony did not fulfill the requirements of the rule. In particular, the summary did not inform

Mr. Koch as to what Ms. Yeager's opinions about "the dynamics of delayed disclosure as it
relates to child sexual abuse" might be. And, the summary did not inform Mr. Koch of what Ms.
Yeager's opinions "regarding behavior of children who have been sexually abused" were. It
turned out that, at least according to Ms. Yeager, there are four phases, i.e., engagement, sexual
interaction, secrecy and disclosure, "that kids go through in that whole process of sexual
abuse[.]" T pg. 697, In. 23-25. However, the expert witness disclosure did not give Mr. Koch
notice that Ms. Yeager would testifY to any of that. In addition, it did not inform him as to the
facts and data Ms. Yeager relied upon in coming to her opinion that these four phases actually
exist.
The summary did give notice that Ms. Yeager would "testifY that it is rare that a child
immediately discloses their sexual abuse especially when they know the perpetrator," but it did
not disclose that Ms. Yeager was going to testifY that sometimes children disclose because of an
overwhelming sense of shame or humiliation. Nor did the summary disclose how Mr. Yeager
came to hold those opinions, i.e., the facts and data underlying her opinion.
The state argues that it could not provide any facts or data because "Yeager's general
expert testimony about child sex abuse was not based on any particular or specifically
identifiable data source, but on her years of experiences as an expert in the field." State's Brief,
pg. 10. But if there were no facts or data supporting Ms. Yeager's opinions, i.e., that they were
based upon clinical experience and anecdotes, Mr. Koch was entitled to know that. However,
that does not appear to be the case because, according to Ms. Yeager, "there [has been] lots
published and lots of documents about that." T Vol. II, pg. 27, In. 16-21. Presumably, there are
facts and data within those presumably peer review publications and other documents. If not,
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Mr. Koch was still entitled to be made aware of that, since Ms. Yeager testified she relied upon
those publications and documents in forming her opinions. T Vol. II, pg. 27, In. 16-21. The
problem is none of those publications or documents were disclosed to Mr. Koch notwithstanding
his specific discovery request, his pretrial motion to compel compliance with the discovery rule
and his contemporaneous objection to her testimony. Mr. Koch still does not know what these
publications and documents are.
This Court should vacate the conviction because the state should not have been permitted
to present Ms. Yeager's testimony which was highly damaging to the defense theory.

B.

The Multiple Erroneous Rulings During the Trial Deprived Mr. Koch of a Fair Trial
1.

Error during the state's opening statement

During opening statement, the state said to the jury that "[t]he defendant started talking to
C[.] about things he should have never shared with a 13-year-old girl." This was objected to as
argumentative and that objection was overruled. T Vol. I, pg. 198, In. 16-23.
The state argues the comment was proper because it "stated a broadly held societal view
regarding the appropriateness of sexually explicit conversations with children in the context of
her summary ofthe evidence supporting the state's theory of the case[.]" State's Brief, pg. 13.
But the state's argument proves too much. Its belief that sexually explicit conversations are
wrong and possibly immoral mayor may not be "broadly held,"] but its value judgment about
such conversations is clearly not evidence which the state expects to produce in support of its

] As acknowledged by the state, there was evidence at trial that Mr. and Ms. Koch held
"open and liberal sexual attitudes" and would speak openly about sexual matters to their daughter
T.K. State's Brief, pg. 3. Whether there is a broadly held societal view against frankly
discussing sexual matters with one's own teenaged daughter is highly doubtful.
3

charge. (Indeed, the state presented no evidence about the moral rightness or wrongness of such
conversations, nor would such evidence be relevant.) While the state is permitted to describe the
evidence of those conversations, assuming a good-faith belief it will be able to present that
evidence, what it may not do in opening statements is attach moral judgments to the evidence it
intends to present. See State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 56, 539 P.2d 604, 608 (1975). ("Counsel
should not at that time attempt to impeach or otherwise argue the merits of evidence that the
opposing side has or will present.") The court erred in overruling Mr. Koch's objection.
2.

Evidentiary error during the testimony of Lisa Conn

Mr. Koch argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the contents of
two text messages sent to Lisa Conn allegedly from Mr. Koch because there was insufficient
foundation to show Mr. Koch sent the texts.
The state responds that "it was sufficient for foundational purposes that C.C. and C.C.'s
mother [Lisa Conn] testified they recognized Koch's phone number and email address and that
the content of those communications led both of them to believe that they were communicating
with Koch." State's Brief, pg. 17. However, Ms. Conn did not specifically testify that she
recognized the telephone number of the sender during the first incident. She only said in a
general sense that she had received telephone calls in the past from Mr. Koch and that she had
received texts from that same number. T Vol. I, pg. 259, In. 12 - pg. 260, In. 12. As to the
second text, Ms. Conn testified that she didn't recognize the number. She said that "the text
message came from a number that I didn't recognize .... And I said, I'm sorry. I don't
recognize this number. Who is this?" T Vol. I, pg. 264, In. 3-4. And, if the "content of those
communications" are to be believed, Michael Koch did not send the first text message since the
4

second one related that someone had hacked into his computer and was sending messages under
his name.
Notwithstanding the state's attempt to tum lemons into lemonade, State v. Harris, 358
S. W.3d 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011), supports Mr. Koch's position. While Lisa Conn said she had
received text messages in the past from Mr. Koch's phone number, she did not testify that she
recognized his number when testifying about the first text message. And, she specifically
testified that she didn't recognize the number that the second text came from. Under the
reasoning in Harris, the text messages here are inadmissible.
The court abused its discretion because it treated the legal question of whether sufficient
foundation has been presented as merely an issue to be raised during cross-examination. But the
question of the weight of the evidence is different from the question of its admissibility. As our
Supreme Court has stated, a proper foundation for proffered evidence is "a condition precedent to
its admission." State v. Joy, 151 Idaho 1, 15,304 P.3d 276,290 (2013).
State v. Thompson, 777 N.W.2d 717 (N.D. 2010), a case cited by the state, is easily

distinguishable. There the defendant: 1) admitted sending the victim text messages earlier that
day; 2) the victim recognized the defendant's phone number and a unique signature on her text
messages; and 3) the defendant conceded the text message in question was sent by her phone but
said that the victim "may have used her phone to send the message to himself." 777 N.W.2d at
623. Here, by contrast: 1) Mr. Koch did not admit sending the messages; 2) Ms. Conn did not
testify she recognized the telephone number from the first text and testified she did not recognize
the number from the second; 3) there was no testimony about a unique signature on either email;
and 4) there was no admission by Mr. Koch that his phone was used to send the emails. Plainly,
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Thompson is not analogous to this case.
Finally, the state fails to address Rodriguez v. State, 273 P.3d 845, 849-850 (Nev. 2012),
cited by Mr. Koch in his Opening Brief. In Rodriguez the Nevada Court found only two of 12
text messages admissible and then only because there was bus surveillance video demonstrating
that a co-defendant, with Rodriguez seated next to him and watching, held and operated the cell
phone during the time the messages were sent. No similar foundation was offered here.
The court abused its discretion in admitting testimony about these two text messages.
3.

Evidentiary errors during the testimony of C.C.

(i) Irrelevant evidence
Mr. Koch contends that the court erred in admitting evidence from C.C. that Mr. Koch
"did not enjoy the way that [Ms. Koch] would give him a blow job, oral sex." T Vol. I, pg. 304,
In. 2-17. The state apparently concedes Mr. Koch's argument that whether or not Mr. Koch
enjoyed his wife's oral sex techniques is irrelevant, but instead pursues an alternative theory for
its admission, i.e., evidence of "grooming behavior." State's Brief, pg. 21. This is not the case
for several reasons.
First, had that been the limited purpose for which the court was admitting the evidence, it
would have given a limiting instruction in response to Mr. Koch's relevancy objection instead of
simply overruling it without explanation. In fact, the evidence was offered and admitted for
precisely the purpose Mr. Koch argues it was. Second, there is nothing in the record to suggest
such a statement to C.C. would be evidence of grooming. Thus, it would be still be inadmissible
for lack of relevance. Ms. Yeager, the only witness arguably qualified to give such testimony,
testified after C.c.'s testimony was over. Further, Ms. Yeager did not address the concept of
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grooming in her testimony. See T Vol. I, pg. 694, In. 11.
Finally, the state cites to State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2010).
There, the Court found that evidence of sexual comments toward the complaining witness,
showing her pornography, the use of rewards and punishments, and other sexual acts were
relevant as showing "steps allegedly effectuating a plan to accomplish the charged offenses."
150 Idaho 729, 249 P.3d at 1176. That same pattern of steps is simply not present here and

Truman is not apposite. (To the extent the state argues that the evidence was admissible as
evidence of a plan under LR.E. 404(b), Mr. Koch notes that he was not given proper notice of the
state's intent to use this type of 404(b) prior to trial, CR 74-75, and it would be inadmissible on
that basis alone. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230, 178 P.3d 28,33 (2008).)

(iO Irrelevant evidence within a non-responsive answer
Mr. Koch objected to the testimony that C.C. "wouldn't go to Renaissance High School,
the high school [she] had gotten into, '" because [she] didn't want to see ... Michael or Tori
or Salina." T pg. 333, In. 12 - pg. 334, In. 6. He argued in his Opening Brief that this evidence
was both irrelevant and non-responsive to the state's question.
The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo. Perception Const.

Management v. Bell, 151 Idaho 250, 252, 254 P .3d 1246, 1248 (2011). Here, whether or not
C.C. decided she couldn't go to her "special" high school because she might run into a member
of the Koch family does not tend to prove any fact of consequence to the determination of the
action. The state does not respond to this issue in its brief and has apparently conceded the point.
Mr. Koch rests on his Opening Brief as to why the trial court abused its discretion in not
permitting Mr. Koch to object to the same evidence as non-responsive.
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(iii) Foundation for an email and text messages to C. C.

Mr. Koch argues that C.C. should not have been allowed to testifY that she received an
email from Mr. Koch asking about her dad based upon the foundation that she recognized his
email address as "Dolphins Fan something, something." Tpg.337,ln. 12-17. He also argued
that State's Exhibit 17, a series of photographs showing a text message exchange between C. C.
and someone using Mr. Koch's telephone, was not admissible. C.C. was permitted to testifY that
the sender was Mr. Koch based upon her partial recollection of his cell phone number. T pg.
363, In. 5-7. The foundation for this testimony and the exhibit was inadequate for the reasons
argued in section B(2) above and will not be repeated here in the interests of brevity.
(iv) Non-responsive answer by c.c. during cross-examination

Mr. Koch objected to C.C.'s testimony about Mr. Koch being "very adamant
about douching and things after you have sex" as not responsive to the prosecutor's question, "So
you were laying on the bathroom floor and crying?" Mr. Koch rests on his Opening Brief as to
why the trial court abused its discretion in not permitting Mr. Koch to object to the same
evidence as non-responsive. The objection should have been sustained.
4.

Evidentiary errors during the testimony of Salina Koch

Mr. Koch argues that Salina Koch should not have been permitted to answer the
prosecutor's question about whether she recalled, "explaining to Detective McGilvery that if
Michael had been happy in your relationship, that he wouldn't have done anything?" T pg. 666,
In. 4-8. Ms. Koch answered, "I do remember that comment, yes, ma'am." T pg. 666, In. 9.
The state first argues that Mr. Koch did not preserve the issue for appeal. State's Brief,
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pg. 22. While it is true that Mr. Koch made an unadorned objection to the question, it is obvious
from the context that the basis is relevance. The question and objection are set forth below:
Q. All right. But do you recall further explaining to Detective - when Detective
McGilvery said why would you say you were responsible for it, that you provided
him with an explanation? Do you remember providing him with an explanation?
A. Providing the detective with an explanation of Q. Why you were responsible for what happened between the defendant and
[C.C].
MR. SMETHERS: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. SMETHERS: Judge, I need a side bar.
T Vol. II, pg. 665, In. 10-22. An objection stating specific grounds is only required "if the
specific grounds [is] not apparent from the context." I.R.E. l03(a)(1). Here, it is obvious from
the context the objection is relevancy. Thus, the state's argument is without merit.
Next the state argues the court did not abuse its discretion2 in admitting the evidence
because it was relevant as it "pointed to a potential motive for, or reasoning behind, Koch's
criminal conduct - that he was unhappy in his marriage." State's Brief, pg. 22. But that is
incorrect. The evidence had nothing to do with Mr. Koch's motive to commit the charged
offenses. It was Ms. Koch expressing her belief that ifher husband sought comfort from C.c. it
must have been due to unhappiness in their marriage. That belief says nothing about Mr. Koch's
state of happiness with his marriage. In addition, the unstated premise of the argument, i. e., that

As previously noted, questions of relevancy are reviewed de novo. Perception Canst.
Management v. Bell, supra.
2
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unhappiness in marriage creates a motive to have sexual contact with underage females is
bizarre. Ms. Koch's statement of her belief had nothing to do with a fact of consequence in this
case and the court erred by overruling Mr. Koch's objection.
5.

Evidentiary errors during the testimony of Christopher McGilvery

Mr. Koch argued that the state should not have been able to ask the detective "whether or
not [Ms. Koch] recalled talking to C[.] about her concerns that something was going on between
C[.] and Michael?" As previously noted, the defense objection to this question was overruled
and he answered, "Yes." The detective was then asked, "What did she say about that?" He
answered, "[S]he to a degree, danced around that question. She told me at times that she had
thought about that." Defense objected again and was overruled. T Vol. II, pg. 43, In. 19 - pg. 44,
In. 8. Mr. Koch also objected to the question which led to the detective saying that Ms. Koch
"said that ... she had suspicions that something was going on, but she wasn't for sure what." T
Vol. II, pg. 45, In. 3-11. Mr. Koch argued this evidence was inadmissible because it was not an
inconsistent out-of-court statement because it was not inconsistent with her testimony. See T pg.
629, In. 17 - pg. 681, In. 11 (testimony of Salina Koch).
The state responds that "Detective's McGilvery testimony about Sabrina's vague
expressed suspicions about Koch was admissible because it was inconsistent with her prior
testimony." State's Brief, pg. 31. However, this Court should disregard that argument as the
state does not cite the portion of the record it relies upon for that assertion. Further, Mr. Koch's
review of the record did not reveal the basis of the state's assertion.
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C.

The Erroneous Admission of the Recorded Telephone Call was Reversible Error
Mr. Koch argued that there was insufficient foundation to permit the admission of Exhibit

19, the recorded telephone call, as C.C. never testified that the recording was the conversation
between her and Mr. Koch and Detective McGilvery was unable to identifY the male voice as Mr.
Koch. Thus, the foundation was insufficient under LR.E. 901(a).3 The state contends that C.C.'s
testimony that she participated in a recorded call to Mr. Koch and Detective McGilvery's
testimony that he assisted in setting up and recording a phone call was sufficient foundation to
establish that Exhibit 19 was the phone call referred to by C.C. State's Brief, pg. 34. That is not
the case because no one testified that it was Mr. Koch speaking on Exhibit 19.
Moreover, establishing the foundation for the telephone call requires more than just two
state witnesses talking about the same telephone call. The proponent of the evidence must
establish that the recording accurately represented what occurred during the conversation. C.C.
did not testifY that it was an accurate recording and the detective could not because he was not
listening in during the recording. T Vol. II, pg. 32, In. 8-23. The state did not provide any
"evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims, " i. e., a complete and accurate recording of a conversation between C.c. and Mr. Koch.
Thus, it was not admissible under LR.E. 901(a).

3 Subsection (b)(6) of the rule provides an illustration of the application of the rule to
these circumstances. It states that telephone conversations may be authenticated "by evidence
that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone company to a particular
person if ... circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering to be the
once called."
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D.

The Cumulative Effect of the Above Errors Deprived Mr. Koch of a Fair Trial
The state contends that the cumulative error doctrine does not apply because no error has

been shown. State's Brief, pg. 35. That assertion has been shown incorrect above.
III. CONCLUSION

The error in admitting Mydell' s Yeager's testimony was not harmless. It so undermined
the theory of defense that reversal is required for this error alone. The same is true regarding the
admission of Exhibit 19. (As previously noted, the state placed great emphasis on the
confrontation call during closing argument. See, e.g., T Vol. III, pg. 82, In. 22 - pg. 83, In. 5. (" .
. . even after that phone call where C[.] is confronting him ... he's not hanging up, he's not
telling her C[.], you are crazy; C[.], I didn't do this, what are you talking about?"); T Vol. III, pg.
84, In. 24-25. ("The confront call is very important."); T Vol. III, pg. 86, In. 16 - pg. 87, In. 2; T
Vol. III, pg. 85, In. 23 - pg. 86, In. 5; T Vol. III, pg. 86, In. 16 - pg. 87, In. 2.) Alternatively, the
prejudicial effect of all the errors above requires the Court to conclude that the state cannot meet
its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result
absent the errors. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010); citing Chapman

v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Therefore, reversal of the convictions and a remand for a new
trial is still required.
Respectfully submitted thisL

t1'" day of December, 2013.

Dw\M'~~
Dennis Benjamin
\
Attorney for Michael Koch
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